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"OVERALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT HAS BEEN VERY
GOOD FOR CHRISTIANITY" - NOT:
A RESPONSE TO DYSON'S REBUKE
Michael J. Baxter, C.S.C.*
I. SECOND THOUGHTS ON PIus XI; OR, "HEY EVERYBODY, I'M
JUST As HORRIFIED BY FASCISM As THE NEXT GUY"
In an article entitled The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' is Not Enough, Stanley Hauerwas and I take issue with
the prevailing trend among theologians to produce general theories
of the relation between church and state.' Michael Eric Dyson says
that the article delivers "a tough rebuke," and in response he deliv-
ers a tough rebuke of his own.' His rebuke calls for a response -
first, on a matter about which we agree.
I agree with Dyson's criticism that by colluding in Mussolini's
machinations, "Pius XI compromised the politically independent,
socially prophetic, and morally insubordinate voice of the church,"'
and that he is therefore not a very good example of "politics and
Christianity working together." 4 This reference to Pius XI created a
misunderstanding insofar as it led Dyson to conclude that
Hauerwas' and my account is apolitical, socially disembodied, and
promotes what he calls "the moral subordination" of the church to
* Michael J. Baxter, C.S.C., is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Religion at Duke
University and a recipient of the Charlotte W. Newcombe Dissertation Fellowship for 1993-94.
He is currently writing a dissertation tentatively entitled, "Against the Americanists: On the Con-
struction of 'Catholic Social Ethics' in the United States." The author would like to thank Fritz
Bauerschmidt, John Berkman, James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., Stanley Hauerwas, and Frank Len-
tricchia for reading earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1992).
2. Michael E. Dyson, "God Almighty Has Spoken From Washington, D.C. ": American Society
and Christian Faith, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 129 (1992).
3. Id. at 157.
4. Id. at 146. 1 quote Dyson's phrase "politics and Christianity working together" tentatively
because, as I argue below, this formulation is already mistaken insofar as it implies that politics
and Christianity comprise separate spheres.
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the state.5 By the end of this article, I hope it will be clear that this
is anything but the case.
A confession is in order here: We anticipated some misunder-
standing along these lines, so we made a gesture toward what Dyson
calls the "moral insubordination" of the church6 by adverting to the
life and death of Father Max Josef Metzger. This example goes
unmentioned by Dyson (I'm not sure why), yet even readers who did
pick up on it have informed us that a reference to a relatively ob-
scure German Catholic priest in the closing paragraph of a 20-page
article does little to offset the bad impression readers get when they
read the name "Pius XI" in connection with the words "church and
state." We had hoped to use the notion of "the Kingship of Christ"
to criticize the papacy's own compliance with the nation-state dur-
ing the Fascist years (hence the reference to Fr. Metzger) as a way
to pit two voices of Pius XI against each other. But our reference to
Pius XI seems to have carried the wrong rhetorical message, making
it a "bad example." So before going any further, let me assure the
readership: Hey everybody, I'm just as horrified by fascism as the
next guy.
Just about everyone who reads and writes for law journals is
against fascism. The illuminating question is not whether one is
against fascism, but why. And on this score, some basic disagree-
ments emerge between Dyson's position and the one Hauerwas and
I laid out in our article. These disagreements can be summed up as
follows: Dyson is against fascism because it is anti-democratic and
suppresses religious freedom; Hauerwas and I are against fascism
because it sets up a false counter-kingdom to the Kingdom of
Christ.
This summary must be spelled out in more detail, but I state it
here in order to highlight the fact that Dyson thinks about politics
almost entirely in terms of the problematics of managing the nation-
state; that is, in terms of statecraft.8 His criticism of Pius XI is
5. Id. at 139.
6. Id.
7. For a short summary of Metzger's life, see LEONARD SWIOLER, BLOODWITNESS FOR PEACE
AND UNITY: THE LIFE OF MAX JOSEF METZGER (1977).
8. This understanding of politics as statecraft, so widely assumed in contemporary political the-
ory, runs in sharp contrast to classical Augustinian and Thomistic understanding of politics as the
practice of acting on behalf of the common good, as I explain below. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text. For an explanation of the difference between these two understandings, see
ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
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couched almost entirely in terms of statecraft; his glowing account
of the First Amendment9 is cast in terms of statecraft; his working
definition of "politics" is confined to statecraft; and his overall argu-
ment is driven by a theory of statecraft - specifically, a liberal
democratic (and American) theory of statecraft. To put it bluntly,
Dyson writes as a theologian of statecraft, as an apologist of the
First Amendment.
I want to spell out the problems with this approach by arguing:
(1) that Dyson's reflections amount to little more than an apologia
for American liberal democracy; (2) that this kind of apologia,
when undertaken by Catholics in America, has been disastrous in
that it has fostered their "moral subordination" to the nation-state;
and (3) that "the Kingship of Christ," when properly construed in
political terms, can generate the theological resources needed to
sustain the church's moral insubordination.
The decisive problem with Dyson's position is that he assumes
that Christianity is not in itself "political," and must therefore be
translated into political terms and then applied to the wider "pub-
lic" concerns of "the nation." He thinks that Christians who do not
undertake this task are irresponsible and irrelevant.1" Hence, a pre-
mium is placed on a Christianity that is willing "to engage the
nitty-gritty world of real politics,"" which for Dyson means nation-
state politics. In spite of his own best intentions, Dyson's political
vision is, in a word, Constantinian. 12 Because he equates Constan-
tinianism with religious establishment, he believes that the First
Amendment is a sure guarantee against Constantinianism. But his
critique of Hauerwas and me, as well as his positive reading of the
First Amendment, are themselves generated out of a Constantinian
vision not entirely unlike that of Pius XI. For it was Pius XI's Con-
stantinian vision that made him all too ready to "engage the nitty-
gritty world of real politics" and led him to compromise the integ-
rity of the church; it also blinded him to signs of the holocaust that
was to come. In light of such a legacy, we would do well, I think, to
consider how enthusiastic theological endorsements of the First
Amendment, such as Dyson's, might be leading Christians in
America to make similar compromises with secular power and
9. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
10. Dyson, supra note 2, at 146.
11. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
12. See infra note 66 (providing a definition of the term "Constantinian").
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might be blinding us to signs of similar holocausts that have been
going on for years."
II. "OVERALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT HAS BEEN- VERY GOOD
To CHRISTIANITY": DYSON'S FIRST AMENDMENT APOLOGETICS
Dyson's apologia for the First Amendment view of religion rests
on the claim that "the most important distinction is not between
conduct and mere belief, but between freedom of conscience and the
coercion to believe." '14 Disregarding the separationist direction that
has prevailed in most Supreme Court rulings on church-state cases
since Everson v. Board of Education,'" Dyson argues that "[tihis
distinction is made clear when we carefully consider in historical
context the easily misinterpreted terms of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson, the prime architects of the constitutional concept
of freedom of religion."1" He then proceeds to clarify these "easily
misinterpreted terms" by narrating this historical context.1
7
The narrative is a familiar one. The scene is set with the ritual
invocation of the religious wars of Europe and the specter of estab-
lished religion and religious strife in America. The antagonist in the
drama is the Church of England (and its colonial surrogates), which
is marked by "rigid constraints and narrow practices" and an insis-
tence on defining "the Church in the singular.' 8 The protagonists
are New Light Presbyterians, Strict Congregationalists, Separate
Baptists, Methodists, and apparently any other Protestant denomi-
13. James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., Die Buben sind unser UnglIvck! The Holocaust and Abortion,
in RACHEL WEEPING 141-238 (1982).
14. Dyson, supra note 2, at 131.
15. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a New Jersey statute authorizing
reimbursement of parents for transportation costs incurred by busing their children to public or
private, sectarian schools). For a discussion of the separationism upheld in Everson, see Mary Ann
Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991).
16. Dyson, supra note 2, at 131.
17. Like many interpreters of the First Amendment (including Glendon & Yanes, supra note
15), Dyson defends his interpretation with an appeal to what was really happening at the time of
the First Amendment's inception and, more specifically, what was happening inside the heads of
those who drafted the amendment. In Dyson's case, this appeal to "what really happened" is
particularly puzzling due to his ready use elsewhere of Stanley Fish's interpretation. The effect of
Fish's work on First Amendment interpretation and on legal and literary theory in general has
been to obliterate the assumption that we can ascertain the correct interpretation of a given text
on the basis of authorial intention or some historical account of the "objective" facts. For an
exposition of Fish's account of interpretation in legal and literary theory, see generally DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY and THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING. Too (1994).
18. Dyson, supra note 2, at 134.
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nation with a low ecclesiology. These protagonists display a "vibrant
religious diversity" which demands that the church be "reconceived
in the plural."19 The protagonists prevail and the church is "recon-
ceived in the plural" - thanks to an unprecedented maneuver in
statecraft whereby religious beliefs are deemed matters of opinion
and the government is designed not on the basis of revelation but on
the basis of reason and natural rights. The centerpiece of this new
arrangement is the First Amendment, "a brilliantly preemptive and
bloodless resolution of religious conflict."20
For bringing about this resolution, Dyson gives credit to Enlight-
enment thinkers, particularly John Locke. But the real heroes in this
story are America's Founders - Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington - who are not only on
the mark regarding theory, but also have the wit and wisdom to put
theory into practice. Paragons of moderation and good judgment,
the Founders are enlightened enough to see beyond the narrow con-
straints of orthodoxy, yet shrewd enough to appreciate Christianity's
usefulness in forging a "public" morality for the new nation. With
this arrangement in place, Dyson suggests, there emerges unprece-
dented possibilities in the sphere of statecraft: a political order
grounded not in some version of orthodox Christian truths, but in
the "common moral community" of the various groups in the Re-
public.21 This produces a "civil" religion (or what Franklin and
others call a "public" religion) which provides the foundations of a
"public morality," thereby contributing to the flourishing of the na-
tion.22 This new arrangement is considered a blessing not only for
the nation but for Christianity as well, for "with the First Amend-
ment a large and vital Christian purpose was served ' 2 3 - to wit,
"The ideals of Christian love and tolerance were ironically promoted
through the government's refusal to cede Christianity official sta-
tus."24 Thus the First Amendment ushers in a new, win-win ar-
rangement in statecraft relations; happily teaming up to construct
this new Republic, both church and state make out quite well.
Dyson's narrative would read like a straight comedy ("all's-well-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 137.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 135-36.
24. Id. at 136.
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that-ends-well"), 25 if it were not for what he calls "the glaring ex-
ception"; that is, "chattel slaves, who were for most of their enslave-
ment legally barred from free worship without white supervision. '"26
When it comes to slaves, Dyson points out, the new Republic yields
no freedom of religion - yet this observation is immediately fol-
lowed up with an explanation that diminishes the impact of this
glaring exception, turning it into a parenthetical remark. Dyson
writes: "But even black Christians came to cherish the First
Amendment because it protected their hard won freedom to worship
without governance, while also giving legal expression to their con-
cern that other groups not suffer similar penalties of social and reli-
gious intolerance. '27 The effect of this follow-up explanation is to
suspend whatever suspicions might be aroused in the reader owing
to the fact that here in America, land of the religiously free, white
slave owners policed the religious practices of black slaves. By avert-
ing the reader's attention from that ugly fact and keeping the focus
on the big picture, Dyson elicits the reader's consent to this conclu-
sion: "Overall the First Amendment has been very good for Christi-
anity." '28 The key word here is "overall": the First Amendment was
not very good for Christianity among chattel slaves, but it has been
very good for Christianity "overall." What we have here is a tragic
episode ("the glaring exception" of "chattel slaves") embedded into
a larger, overriding comedic plot line ("the First Amendment has
been very good for Christianity"), a typical literary feature of the
standard liberal democratic metanarrative.
Of course, Dyson fully intends to put forth a liberal democratic
metanarrative. He interprets the struggle of the Civil Rights move-
ment largely as a success story for liberal democracy in that it pro-
vided a means for African-Americans to survive.29 But Dyson's nar-
rative casts American democracy in more favorable terms than
merely a means for survival. It reads like a civics textbook's account
of American democracy as the monumental solution to the centu-
ries-old problem of religious strife. And like most such accounts, it
conceals the narratives of those for whom America's "freedom of
religion" has not been very good.
25. This notion of comedic plot lines in historical narration is taken from HAYDEN WHITE.
METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 9 (1973).
26. Dyson, supra note 2, at 135.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 136.
29. Id. at 153.
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Take, for example, Dyson's statement that "[b]y disestablishing
religion and establishing religious freedom, the Founders translated
an a priori denial of privilege to any one religion in particular as the
principle for extending privilege to them all.""0 Consider how this
formula has worked out for the "religion" of the Cherokee, the
Sioux, the Navajo, and the Hopi. Whatever Dyson means here by
"religion," it has been made crystal clear to scores of tribes in
North America that what the drafters of the First Amendment
meant by "religion," does not include theirs.3" Nor has it included
the "religion" of the Mormons who, as Frederick Gedicks tells it,
were forced by the Federal government to abandon their divinely
sanctioned practice of plural marriage in order to survive.32 Nor has
it included the political vision that has long been considered consti-
tutive to Catholic "religion"; indeed, Locke's notion of religious tol-
eration explicitly excluded Catholicism.33
Or to take another example, consider how Dyson credits the First
Amendment with "keeping believers from maiming one another over
religious disputes" - an accomplishment, he notes with irony, that
Christians were not able to manage on their own. 4 What Dyson
fails to include here is that now, instead of maiming fellow Ameri-
cans over religious disputes, Christians in the United States maim
Christians and non-Christians of other nations over international
disputes whenever their democratically-elected government orders
them to do so. 35 Furthermore, regarding America's record on reli-
30. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
31. A beginning sampler of how these indigenous peoples fared under the auspices of the First
Amendment might include the following: JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE CHEROKEE NATION (1988) (regarding the Cherokee); RAYMOND F. LOCKE, THE BOOK OF
THE NAVAJO 199-464 (1976) (regarding the Navajo); JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS
(1961) (regarding the Sioux); and FRANK WATERS, BOOK OF THE HoPI 270-328 (1963) (regard-
ing the Hopi).
32. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 167 (1992). Gedicks points out that "plural marriage" is otherwise known as
"polygamy." Id. at 169.
33. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 33 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 1, 15-16 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 1990). The parallel between Locke's denial of freedom
of religion to Catholics and Milton's denial of freedom of speech to Catholics, as explained by
Fish, is unmistakable. See Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing As Free Speech and It's a Good
Thing, Too in DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES 231-33 (Paul Berman ed., 1992).
34. Dyson, supra note 2, at 136.
35. Supplementing the three Christian theories of war outlined by Roland Bainton, John How-
ard Yoder adds a fourth: "the blank check," which, I think it is fair to say, has been exemplified
by the Catholic Church in the United States. See JOHN H. YODER, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TO
WAR. PEACE. AND REVOLUTION: A COMPANION TO BAINTON 82-88 (1983) (defining "blank
19941
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gious freedom during wartime, Dyson's narrative fails to mention
that until recently (1940), the United States government jailed
Christian and other pacifists for resisting conscription. His narrative
also fails to note that the government has never recognized conscien-
tious objection to war, for religious or secular reasons, as a constitu-
tional right (as in Germany) but only as a legislative privilege. And
it also fails to note that the government has consistently refused to
grant any legal status whatsoever to selective conscientious objec-
tion, the official stance of a number of mainline churches.36 So much
for "extending privilege to them all."3
More gloss can be teased out of Dyson's text, but this is enough to
make my main point: His narrative is rigged for the purpose of dem-
onstrating how "overall the First Amendment has been very good to
Christianity," rigged so as to conceal the trade-offs, the com-
promises, the conflicts, and the bloodshed that are part and parcel of
the "national morality." It is a narrative that asserts the primacy of
the Constitution of the United States of America over all else, in-
cluding the church. Indeed, at some points in Dyson's narrative the
nation-state becomes the church, with the United States of America
taking on the ecclesial role of peacemaker and revealer of God's
word in the world.38 Hence the remarkable reversal of traditional
roles in the statement, "Overall the First Amendment has been very
good to Christianity," whereby church-state relations become client-
patron relations; the patron, the First Amendment, has been "very
good" for the client, Christianity. Dyson's narrative of the United
States of America serves this relationship very well: It includes only
what is safe for democracy.
III. "CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS WORKING TOGETHER": MORE
BAD EXAMPLES
Accommodationism is an unexpected problem for someone so
acutely aware of the struggle of blacks to survive white racism, but
check" as a ruler's unaccountable decision to engage in war). For a description of the standard
three theories of war, see ROLAND BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A
HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUTAION 14 (1960) ("Broadly speaking, three atti-
tudes to war and peace were to appear in Christian ethic: pacifism, the just war, and the
crusade.").
36. For more a more detailed examination of conscientious objection, see PAUL RAMSEY, THE
JUST WAR 91-137 (1968); PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE 128-32 (1961).
37. Dyson, supra note 2, at 134.
38. Id. at 136, 156.
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it is unavoidable when one works from a theological paradigm
which: (1) assumes "faith" to be in itself apolitical; (2) defines
"politics" solely in terms of statecraft; and (3) requires "faith" be
translated into "politics." A host of questions arise with this para-
digm, 9 but the point I want to make is this: Given the way Dyson
sets "faith" and "politics" over and against each other, coupled with
his understanding of "politics" as statecraft, any translation of
"faith" into "politics" is going to be absorbed into whatever ideol-
ogy rules the day. The ideology that rules the day for Dyson is
"democracy."
Dyson gives us no theoretical resources with which to resist this
absorption process, or even to be aware that it is going on. This is
because he displays no substantive ecclesiology that can establish an
alternative discursive space to the discourse of democracy. He ex-
tracts from "faith" certain "principles" or "ideals" which hold
strong currency in liberal democratic discourse, such as "justice,"
"equality," and "freedom," while never acknowledging that these
words may have different meanings in ecclesiological discourse.40 In-
deed, at some points in Dyson's text the border between democratic
and ecclesiological discourse seems so porous as to be almost nonex-
istent, as with the utterly mystifying statement, "democracy is a
fundamental norm of prophetic black Christianity.""' It is never
clear what Dyson means by "democracy,' '42 except that not embrac-
ing it is tantamount to engaging in "bad politics." But, in any case,
in this day and age, in the United States of America, when democ-
racy is identified as "a fundamental norm" of Christianity, then it
becomes virtually inevitable that ecclesial discourse will be absorbed
into the ideology of the nation-state. All of which is to say that
"faith," as Dyson conceives of it, possesses a chameleon-like quality
of reflecting whatever colors and hues are dominant in the surround-
39. For example: What specific aspects of "faith" are to be translated into "politics"? Do any
elements of "faith" get lost in the translation into "politics"? If so, which losses in translation are
acceptable and which are not? What criteria should be used in making such judgments?
40. Dyson, supra note 2, at 152.
41. Id. at 130 n.4; see also CORNELL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE!: AN AFRO-AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 18-19 (1982) (discussing the prophetic Christian dialectic of
human nature and human history as it relates to democracy).
42. Dyson, supra note 2, at 154. Several questions arise here about Dyson's use of the word
democracy. Is he referring to nation-state politics? If so, does he mean Majoritarianism? Parlia-
mentarianism? Or something else? Is Dyson happy with the three branches of government? Or is
he referring to the church? If he is referring to the church, then we have to ask: Should congrega-
tions be run democratically? All congregations? Even overtly racist congregations?
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ing "political" environment.
This seemingly apolitical conception of "faith" is itself profoundly
political, in that it posits a "faith" which, having no content of its
own, must transform itself into a discourse that is already sanc-
tioned and approved in "the political realm." In other words, be-
cause "faith" does not possess its own political form, it must be in-
vested with a political form derived from the existing political order.
This forecloses the possibility of a fundamental theological critique
of any existing political order.
Dyson tries to guard against the accommodationist character of
his position by positing a distinction between the functional and
moral subordination of "religion" (which in his idiom occupies the
same conceptual space as "faith") and then declaring that "religion
is without question morally insubordinate to and politically inde-
pendent of the political realm." s But this distinction fails to ac-
knowledge how the hegemony of the modern bureaucratic state
holds sway over civil society by means of the pedagogy of the law,
which instills "civic values" in citizens. Civic values that dissipate
the morally insubordinate potential of subsidiary groups, including
of course the churches." Dyson's perspective reinforces this kind of
domestication insofar as he measures the significance of Christian
civil disobedience (in the Civil Rights and anti-nuclear movements)
in terms of their long-range program of political reform.
As a way of illustrating the accommodationist character of this
"faith-translated-into-politics" paradigm, I want to bring forth an
example: the practice of slavery by Catholics in the United States.
The story of slavery in the Americas goes back to the sixteenth cen-
tury, when African slaves were first brought to the New World by
Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. With few exceptions, this
practice was regularly justified and given moral sanction by the
Catholic Church hierarchy which, as the representative of the estab-
lished church of these empires, acquiesced in the workings of secular
43. Id. at 139.
44. For an explanation of the notion of hegemony as I am using it, see ANTONIO GRAMSCI,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMsci 245-47 (Quintin Hoare and
Geoffrey N. Smith eds. & trans., 1987). See also RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABU-
LARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 117-18 (1976) (detailing the history and evolution of the defini-
tion of hegemony).
45. CYPRIAN DAVIS, O.S.B., THE HISTORY OF BLACK CATHOLICS IN THE UNITED STATES 20-33
(1990). This example is taken almost entirely from Davis's book.
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power." "Religious freedom" in the new Republic did nothing to
alter this arrangement.
In 1785, John Carroll, superior of the priests working in the mis-
sions in Maryland (and eventually archbishop of the Catholic
Church in the United States), reported that of the 15,800 Catholics
in Maryland, 3,000 were black slaves.4 His report expressed no dis-
may over this condition, except that it raised complicated canonical
questions regarding impediments to marriage among slaves by rea-
son of affinity." Indeed, Carroll himself owned slaves, and while he
did, on occasion, harbor reservations about their circumstances,
these emerged out of concern for pastoral care and literacy, not the
injustice of the practice itself." Carroll, who for Catholic historians
serves as the emblematic figure of Catholicism in the Republican
era, was not exceptional. Many bishops owned slaves, as did officials
of several other religious orders. The Jesuits, who served the early
Catholic settlers of Maryland in the mid-seventeenth century, were
the first to use slaves on their estates, and several other slave-owning
religious orders of both men and women followed suit, including: the
Vincentians, the Sulpicians, the Capuchins, the Carmelites, the
Daughters of the Cross, the Religious of the Sacred Heart, the Visi-
tation Sisters, the Dominican Sisters, the Sisters of Charity, and the
Sisters of Loretto.50 It was, in the words of Cyprian Davis, "the
Catholic church in chains."'"
These chains were held in place by a disturbingly truncated eccle-
sial vision on the part of the Catholic clergy, religious orders, and
laity who owned slaves. It was generally understood that slavehold-
ers were responsible for the pastoral well-being of their slaves. Cath-
olic owners could therefore be remarkably solicitous about the pas-
toral care of the slaves in their charges, sponsoring them at baptism,
witnessing their marriages, and arranging for their attendance at
mass on a weekly basis. But rarely, if ever, did slave owners perceive
this pastoral concern for slaves to be in conflict with the exigencies
46. Davis explains that Catholic moral theologians, under the (erroneous) assumption that
black Africans were Moslems, deemed it acceptable, on just war grounds, to enslave them rather
than the indigenous peoples of the New World. For an explanation of this reasoning, as well as
examples of Catholics who opposed slavery and the slave trade, see id. at 21-27.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id. at 37-39.
51. Id. at 38. The second chapter of Davis's history is entitled, "Catholic Settlers and Catholic
Slaves: A Church in Chains."
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of the institution of slavery itself. Yet the conflicts were there. As
critics pointed out (in some cases, as an attempt to advance what
amounted to a theory of "just slavery"), the practice of slavery in
the United States led to the violation of matrimonial rights of black
Catholics, the break-up of their families, the neglect of their cat-
echetical needs, and the denial of adequate food, clothing, and shel-
ter.52 But none of these abuses seems to have claimed much notice.
Nor did Pope Gregory XVI's condemnation of the slave trade in an
1839 apostolic letter entitled In Supremo Apostolatus Fastigio53
have any effect; the encyclical, proponents of slavery argued, did not
refer to circumstances in the United States. 4 Nor did the fact that
most Catholics outside the United States, by the mid-nineteenth
century, found slavery to be intolerable.5 None of these factors
curbed the practice of slavery among Catholics in the United
States. 6
The reason: Church practices such as prayer, the sacraments, de-
votional piety, and so on were generally thought to pertain only to
the soul, not the body. This precluded the possibility of a genuine
Christian politics that is, a politics grounded in the substantive life
of the church (more on this later), and thereby allowed the "polit-
ics" of Catholics to be shaped by their surrounding political and
cultural landscape. This political and cultural landscape included
the assumption of black inferiority." This political conformity held
true even in the years immediately preceding the Civil War. Al-
though by this time there was profound disagreement among
Catholics over slavery, the disagreements were formed along sec-
tional lines. As the nation divided between North and South over
slavery, Catholics also divided accordingly; they conformed to the
political beliefs of the state or section of the country in which they
resided. During these years the Catholic bishops never formally ad-
dressed the issue of slavery; this was a conscious effort to remain
free of "political" matters, leaving them to the discretion of the la-
ity, and thus making it possible in such conflicted times for
Catholics to remain united in "faith. 58
52. Id. at 43-46, 52-56.
53. Id. at 39, 46-47.
54. Id. at 46-47.
55. Id. at 66.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 59.
58. The historical data and analysis cited here is found in JOHN T. ELLIs, AMERICAN CATHOLI-
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This generally accepted division between "faith" and "politics"
among Catholics explains how Catholic slave owners could reconcile
caring for the souls of slaves while at the same time buying, selling,
and abusing their bodies. On the basis of this (corrupt) dichotomy,
ecclesial practices of pastoral care and salvation were rendered
apolitical and therefore adaptable to any politics, including politics
in support of slavery. The result was an assumed harmony between
ecclesial practice ("faith") and secular matters ("politics"). Conflict
between the two was virtually inconceivable. When a conflict did
emerge between the exigencies of slavery and salvation, between the
market value of bodies and the pastoral care of souls (as with non-
canonical marriages or the selling of slaves to non-Catholics 59), the
concerns of salvation and the care of souls were abandoned in favor
of the damnable institution of slavery.6 0
This chameleon-like adaptability of "faith" to "politics" became
even more pronounced during the Civil War. Catholics, including
chaplains, served on both sides of the war, thus creating "Union
Catholics" and "Confederate Catholics." And with time it became
clear that the Catholic "faith" could also be accommodated to the
"politics" of segregation, the so-called Indian Wars, the Spanish
American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and
the Cold War. Catholic "faith" also proved accommodating to the
"politics" of industrial growth in the post-World War II era and the
prosperity that came with it, as well as to the expansion of U.S.
economic interests around the world. All of which is to say that
"faith," as it was mistakenly conceived in this dichotomy, both dur-
ing slavery and since, has been accommodated to whatever is cur-
rently understood to constitute "politics" - thus producing a litany
of "bad examples."
Most Catholic theorists would argue that an appropriate correc-
tive to this faith/politics dichotomy emerged with the development
in the twentieth century of what has come to be known as "public
theology"; that is, a theology that speaks not only to the church but
to "the nation." Claiming the mantle of John Courtney Murray, a
preponderance of Catholic theologians and ethicists have expanded
CISM 91-94 (2d ed. rev. 1969).
59. Selling Catholic slaves to non-Catholics would have imperiled their salvation because, in the
eyes of most Catholic slave owners, one had to be a member of the Catholic Church in order to
gain salvation. For a more detailed description of this tension between the competing interests of
slavery and salvation, see DAVIS, supra note 45, at 39-46.
60. Id.
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this project in the years since Vatican 11.61 Moreover, with the infu-
sion of biblical language into Catholic theological reflection since
the Council, the task of Catholic social ethics has been supposedly
retooled. That task is now understood to be the translation of key
precepts from the gospel ("faith") or the natural law into principles
that can then be applied to the United States' public policy agenda
("politics"). The U.S. Bishops' pastoral letters on war and peace
(1983)62 and the economy (1986)63 are commonly cited by
Catholics and mainstream Protestants as paradigms of the Church's
commitment to providing an ethic for "the nation." But this alleged
shift is a masquerade that has allowed contemporary Catholic social
ethics to maintain "good conscience" while continuing the long tra-
dition of Catholic accommodation to America.64
By translating scriptural or natural law precepts into principles
acceptable in a religiously pluralistic society ("freedom," "justice,"
"equality," and various individual rights), Catholic theologians,
both liberal and neo-conservative, have actually reinforced the polit-
ical machinery they claim to challenge. 5 Likewise, the U.S. Catho-
lic Bishops, by appropriating terms and categories conducive to a
dialogue with U.S. policymakers, have obtusely clung to a reformist
strategy that precludes a fundamental critique of American imperi-
alism and its irreformability. Indeed, this strategy of the bishops, as
well as the general approach of Catholic ethicists, reveals a "Con-
stantinian bias"; that is, a bias toward seeking to influence the con-
sciences of powerholders and to manipulate the political process by
proffering an ethic of statecraft.6" Thus, in the post-Vatican II era,
61. The Vatican Council, 1962-65.
62. The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, 13 ORIGINS I (May 19, 1983).
63. Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 16 ORIGINS 33
(June 5, 1986).
64. The argument that follows is drawn considerably from MICHAEL L. BUDDE, THE Two
CHURCHES: CATHOLICISM AND CAPITALISM IN THE WORLD SYSTEM 74-125 (1992) (discussing how
U.S. "Catholic Nationalism" posits a harmony between religious convictions and moral and civil
responsibility).
65. Id. at 105-25 (identifying this unintended reinforcement of the political machine as a weak-
ness of several prominent Catholic ethicists writing today, including Charles Curran, Richard Mc-
Brien, Dennis McCann, and George Weigel).
66. Id. at 91; see also Dyson, supra note 2 at 133 n.17 (citing Robert N. Bellah, The Idea of
Practices in Habits: A Response, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF HABITS OF
THE HEART 269 (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman eds., 1988)). Bellah defines Constan-
tinianism as the danger that "Christianity will be used instrumentally for the sake of creating
political community but to the detriment of its own authenticity." Dyson, supra note 2, at 133
n.17 (citing Bellah, supra, at 277). But written into this definition is a social vision that describes
"creating political community" solely in pluralistic terms, thus making it impossible to view the
[Vol. 43:425
FIRST AMENDMENT AND CHRISTIANITY
"faith" continues to conform to the dominant political assumptions
of the United States of America. That the Catholic Church in
America today has become so clearly divided into liberal and con-
servative camps indicates its inveterate subservience to American
political culture.
I have elaborated these recent developments in Catholic ethics be-
cause they parallel Dyson's theological agenda and its attendant ac-
commodationism. As profoundly as Dyson's perspective has been
shaped by the history of the black church, it is also determinatively
shaped by the liberal Protestant assumption that "faith" consists
first of an "experience" that must then be given social and political
"expression." 6 This, in turn, shows a deep tension in Dyson's posi-
tion: While readily claiming to proffer a politically charged, morally
insubordinate form of Christianity, he at the same time undertakes
a Constantinian agenda of providing an ethic for the nation.
It is difficult to see how Dyson can have it both ways. Yet the fact
that he wants it both ways explains why he glibly labels any decisive
rejection of Liberal Protestantism's Constantinian project as "secta-
rian. '"68 In the Liberal Protestant context, the term "sectarian" was
developed most powerfully by Troeltsch.6 9 It was then transmitted
to America (with revisions) by H. Richard Niebuhr, ° and it has
been deployed by ethicists and historians, working under Niebuhr's
spell, 71 as a way to marginalize any theological perspective that
finds Christianity to be at fundamental odds with America. In em-
ploying the term "sectarian," Dyson positions himself squarely
within this tradition. Functioning comfortably within Liberal Prot-
estant categories, Dyson's account of the relation between American
construction of local forms of Christian community as a political task. Bellah is working from a
liberal democratic understanding of politics, as opposed to a classical Aristotelian and Thomistic
one.
67. 1 regard Dyson's theological position as reflective of what George Lindbeck refers to as
"experiential expressivism." See GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION
AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 31 (1984).
68. Dyson, supra note 2, at 139-40.
69. For a development of the term sectarian, see ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES (Olive Wyon, trans. 1931) (both volumes).
70. See H..RICHARD NIEBUHR. CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951); H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. THE SO-
CIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM (1929).
71. 1 would include John C. Bennett and Martin E. Marty among the scholars working under
Niebuhr's spell, both of whom Dyson cites. Dyson, supra note 2, at 132 n.9 (citing MARTIN E.
MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (1984)). See also
id. at 135 n.22 (citing John C. Bennett, Church and State in the United States, in REFORMED
FAITH AND POLITICS 121 (Ronald H. Stone ed., 1983)).
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democracy and Christian faith accepts a most remarkable assump-
tion; namely, that the interests of the prophetic black church coin-
cide with the interests of the United States of America.
I do not believe that Dyson can escape this assumption as long as
he continues to work out of a theoretical paradigm that requires
"faith" to be translated into "politics." Indeed, insofar as his narra-
tive attributes the success of the Civil Rights movement to the em-
ployment of this theoretical paradigm, this assumption is intracta-
ble. But along with it comes this danger: when "faith" is thought to
lack a political shape of its own, its translation into "politics" will
inexorably and invariably lead to an affirmation of American de-
mocracy as the best available "method of finding proximate solu-
tions to insoluble problems."72 The phrase belongs to Reinhold
Niebuhr, and one can clearly detect a Niebuhrian ring in Dyson's
text, particularly where he chides Hauerwas and me, in good Chris-
tian Realist fashion, for refusing "to engage the nitty-gritty world of
real politics. .... ,,73
This raises a crucial methodological question: What criteria
should we use in this "nitty-gritty world of real politics" in making
discriminating judgments about matters of relative justice? Criteria
such as "equality" and "freedom" are not adequate in themselves as
became increasingly clear when Reinhold Niebuhr moved from the
role of critic of American capitalism in the thirties to that of apolo-
gist of American cold war politics in the fifties.74 Given Dyson's ac-
count of the harmony between Christianity and American democ-
racy, one wonders whether there are any criteria which would lead
him to conclude that the imperium called the United States of
America just might be a counter-kingdom to the Kingdom of Christ.
IV. THE KINGSHIP OF CHRIST AND THE PRACTICES OF
CHRISTIAN POLITICS
Dyson's assumption that "faith" must be translated into "polit-
ics" compels him to read a theological notion like the "Kingship of
Christ" as inherently apolitical. It is this reading, a false one I shall
72. The phrase comes from REINHOLD NIEBUHR. THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN
OF DARKNESS 118 (1960).
73. Dyson, supra note 2, at 159.
74. For an example of this progression, compare REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IM-
MORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1936) with REINHOLD NIEBUHR. THE
STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND EMPIRES (1959).
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argue, that gives rise to his thumping charge that Hauerwas and I
proffer an apolitical, socially disembodied version of Christianity.
This is not so, but in order to see why, one must undertake a differ-
ent description of politics.
If "politics" is described in liberal democratic terms - as an ar-
rangement in which the conflicting interests of individuals and sub-
sidiary groups are adjudicated by the state - then substantive reli-
gious convictions must be translated into "interests," thus divesting
them of any inherent political valence. However, if "politics" is
redescribed in traditional theological terms - as the art of achiev-
ing the common good through participation in the divine life of God
- then substantive religious convictions are central to legitimate
political authority, and interest group "politics" is not truly "polit-
ics" at all, but a cacophonous conflict of wills. 75 Understood theolog-
ically, politics entails the ordering of human relationships according
to their ultimate end: God. The primary political setting in which
this ordering occurs is the church. If the true polis is constituted by
the practices of assembled Christians called "the church," the "pil-
grim City of God,"76 then "faith" is intrinsically political. Christi-
anity does not "work with politics," nor "apply to politics," nor have
"political implications." Christianity is always already political.
A Christian understanding of politics is grounded in what Luigi
Sturzo, among others, called a "sociology of the supernatural. 77
The importance of a sociology of the supernatural, or "integral soci-
ology," was that it rejected the existence (in anything but the ab-
stract 78) of a permanent level of fixed natural law, "pure nature,"
75. Augustine, Concerning the City of God, Against the Pagans 877-83 (Henry Bettenson
trans., 1984) (3d ed. 1467).
76. Id. at 761-842.
77. LUIGI STURZo, THE TRUE LIFE: SOCIOLOGY OF THE SUPERNATURAL (Barbara Barclay
Carter trans., 1943) [hereinafter STURZO. TRUE LIFE]. Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959) was a social
theorist, historian, political leader, and Catholic priest. Influenced in his seminary training by Leo
XlII's Rerurn Novarum and by the teachings of economist Guiseppe Toniolo, Sturzo moved into
politics. R.C. Pollock, Sturzo, Luigi, in 13 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 749-50 (1967). First
he was deputy mayor of Caltagirone between 1905 and 1920; later, he was the moving spirit
behind the Partito Popolare, forerunner of the Italian Christian Democratic party. Id. A demo-
cratic party of Catholic orientation, the Partito Popolare, was suppressed by Mussolini in 1926, by
which time Sturzo had been in exile for two years. Id. During his years in exile, Sturzo authored
several books, including ITALY AND FASCISM (1927), THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE
RIGHT OF WAR (1930), CHURCH AND STATE (1939), THE TRUE LIFE (1943) and INNER LAWS OF
SOCIETY (1944).
78. STURZO. TRUE LIFE, supra note 77, at 73 (noting that "pure nature" had to be posited in
the abstract in order to preserve the gratuity of grace).
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upon which politics could be built. Instead, it affirmed the necessity
of referring politics to its transcendent, final cause. Sturzo's notion
of "integral sociology" consists of the endeavor, in John Milbank's
words, "to read all human society as 'supernatural' or as groping
toward the 'true life' of proper relation to God and to fellow human
beings: here alone, one has a 'sociology.' 79 A "sociology of the su-
pernatural," in other words, is shaped by a particular mode of
human association, the church. It recognizes faith not in theoretical
speculation or interior "belief" but in the social forms which deci-
sively bind its members together: "[R]eligious practices, and the
ideas embodied in those practices." 80 Thus Sturzo's "integral sociol-
ogy" proceeds beyond the sociology of secular positivism (Comte
and Durkheim8t ), and beyond that of theocratic positivism (de
Bonald and de Maistre82), to arrive at a vision of human community
that is irreducibly supernatural.
Sturzo's sociology of the supernatural is fully ecclesial and intrin-
sically political, because the church is the site at which human final-
ity is definitively encountered and partially realized.8" As such, the
church is the normative form of politics, constituted by the sacra-
ments, traditions, creeds, stories of martyrs and saints, works of
mercy, and a full array of activities directed to the transformation
of social structures through lay Christian influence. In the thirties
and forties these activities came under the heading of "Catholic Ac-
tion," a church-sponsored program of lay formation designed to re-
sist the totalizing character of the modern state. Sturzo argued that
because the encroaching dominance of the modern state "aspire[d]
to be a Weltanschauung, a conception of the world and of life, in
substance a religion," Catholic Action must serve as a means to ad-
vance a counter-hegemonic Christian Weltanschauung.84
79. JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASONING 224-25
(1991). My presentation of Sturzo is deeply indebted to Milbank.
80. Id. at 225.
81. For a discussion of the contrast between Sturzo and both Comte and Durkheim, see id. at
224.
82. In de Bonald and de Maistre we find groundwork for the kind of reactionary Catholic
political thought that in some ways became a precursor to Fascism. For a critique of de Bonald
and de Maistre, see id. at 51-71. For an exploration into the proto-Fascist elements in de Mais-
tre's thought, see Isaiah Berlin, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Sept. 27, 1990, at 57-64; Isaiah Berlin, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism: II, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS. Oct. 11, 1990, at 54-58; Isaiah Berlin, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fas-
cism: IH, N.Y. REV. BOOKS. Oct. 25, 1990, at 61-65.
83. MILBANK, supra note 79, at 224.
84. LUIGI STURZO, CHURCH AND STATE 535 (1939) [hereinafter STURZO, CHURCH AND
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It is in this context that Sturzo's work in the Christian Demo-
cratic Party must be understood. For Sturzo, Christian Democracy
was a profoundly ecclesial and unmistakably Catholic movement
designed to combat the deleterious effects of state sponsored secular-
ism upon the family and the education of the youth. Toward this
end Sturzo wrote, "Christian democrats have acted as mystical cur-
rents among the masses."8 5 As such, Sturzo's Christian democracy
was a far cry from Dyson's Americanist version of democracy as a
political movement contained within a purely secularized realm. In-
deed, Sturzo contended that American democracy "suffered the ef-
fects of rationalistic and even positivist political philosophies," 6 re-
suiting in, among other things, a pervasive "religious agnosticism in
the ruling classes and in the schools." 87 This intellectual milieu, evi-
dent most clearly in the fields of sociology and political science, "in-
vaded the realm of legislations, took the place of Christian tradi-
tions and created its own public and private morality which was
defined as the 'way of life' of each people or nation." 88
Because Sturzo's "sociology of the supernatural" is, in Milbank's
words, "an attempt to read all historical and social reality through
the practice of the Church,"89 all the various historical configura-
tions of the relationship between church and state must be "read"
against the politics inherent in the church's own "true life." Re-
sisting the impulse to declare any one particular church-state config-
uration as normative, Sturzo opted instead to employ the grammar
of the church in making judgments as to how the church might best
negotiate its position amid the historical forces at work in a given
context.90 These judgments varied, depending on the possibilities
and constraints entailed in the church's position vis-az-vis the govern-
ment of a specific time and place. Faithful Christian politics would
take one form in the medieval times, another form in antiquity, yet
another in a Communist totalitarian setting, and still another form
in relation to a modern liberal state.91
STATE].
85. STURZO, TRUE LIFE, supra note 77, at 264.
86. Luigi Sturzo, The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy, 9 REv. POL. 3, 8
(1947).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. MILBANK, supra note 79, at 225.
90. Id. at 260-64.
91. Id.
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So then, what form would faithful church politics take in the con-
temporary United States? An answer is suggested in the work of
Paul Hanley Furfey who, like Sturzo, grounded politics in "super-
natural sociology."92 Also like Sturzo, Furfey rebelled against any
tendency to conceive of "the social" apart from theological catego-
ries. Scientific data, he argued, can never in themselves provide a
true understanding of society; rather, such understanding must
come from a comprehensive social vision such as that laid out by
Augustine and Aquinas. 93 Furfey's social vision was resolutely theo-
logical, grounded in the trinitarian notion of charity as "participa-
tion in the immanent life of God"9" and in the doctrine of "the Mys-
tical Body of Christ."9 5
Furfey's "supernatural sociology" is best seen as a form of Catho-
lic integralism, but not the brand of integralism that served as a
vehicle for European fascist ideology, which both Furfey and Sturzo
strongly rebuked. Although the "confessional state" (with Catholi-
cism as the established religion) was the norm for conventional
Catholic church-state theory in his time, Furfey never endorsed the
confessional state theory with its coercive implications. He opted in-
stead to stress the voluntaristic and peaceable character of infused
charity. 96 As part of his contention that the major institutions of
modern capitalist society have been captured by the world and that
Christians have grown dangerously complacent in a "corrupt" age
that is "shockingly at variance with [Catholic] principles, 97 Furfey
advocated "the duty of bearing witness" 98 and "the technique of
non-participation." 9 9 These were strategies for calling into question
the existing social order and for generating a Christian alternative
to that order. 100
One of Furfey's concrete alternatives was the Catholic Worker,
for which he was an unofficial theological spokesperson. Founded in
1933 by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, the Catholic Worker is
92. PAUL H. FURFEY. FIRE ON THE EARTH 1-21 (1936).
93. Id. at 9-11.
94. Id. at 32.
95. Id. at 51.
96. For Furfey's ambivalence on the confessional state, see id. at 90. For his emphasis on the
interior, noncoercive character of charity, see MEL PIEHL, BREAKING BREAD: THE CATHOLIC
WORKER AND THE ORIGIN OF CATHOLIC RADICALISM IN AMERICA 126-28 (1982).
97. FURFEY, supra note 92, at 97.
98. Id. at 98-116.
99. Id. at 117-36.
100. Id. at 97.
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committed to a concrete embodiment of gospel through prayer, the
sacraments, feeding and housing the poor and homeless, and wit-
nessing for peace.101 The ethos of the Catholic Worker may be
summed up as a commitment to embodying the lesson in the parable
of the last judgment. 10 2 In that parable, the Son of man is identified
as a king and the virtuous enter eternal life by putting into practice
the works enumerated by the king: feeding the hungry, clothing the
naked, visiting the sick, and caring for prisoners. Thus, performing
these practices is what it means to live under the Kingship of Christ.
The shape of this life was profoundly political - why else would
the Federal Bureau of Investigation have a thick file on Dorothy
Day? 03 - but it was a Christian politics that constantly negotiated
the claims placed on that life by other political, economic, and social
authorities in light of the church's vocation of faithfully embodying
Christ in the world. Thus the concrete embodiment of this christo-
logically-formed politics has ranged widely over the years: fighting
for housing rights for the poor; supporting labor, such as striking
sailors and farm workers; setting up work camps for conscientious
objectors during World War II; protesting against nuclear weapons;
organizing resistance to the draft and the Vietnam War; harboring
Central American refugees; and so on. In an effort to "make the
encyclicals click," as Peter Maurin put it, 104 the Catholic Worker
takes Rerum Novarum10 5 and Quadragesimo Anno0 6 in a dis-
tributist or decentralist direction, which results in a "localist polit-
ics" that provides an alternative to the depersonalizing bureaucracy
of the modern liberal nation-state.10 7
What the Catholic Worker exemplifies is that Christian faith, in
and of itself, is political and that it embodies this politics in the very
gathering of Christians to live out the gospel. There are many
Christian communities that exemplify this kind of politics, only a
101. DOROTHY DAY, THE LONG LONELINESS 169-286 (1952).
102. Matthew 25:31-46 (Jerusalem Bible).
103. JAMES W. MCCLENDON, JR., ETHICS: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 276 (1986).
104. DAY, supra note 101, at 194.
105. Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical on the Condition of the Workingmen (Rerum Novarum, May
15, 1891), reprinted in SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS: FOURTEEN EPOCHAL DOCUMENTS BY POPE LEO
XIII 164 (Joseph Husslein ed., 1940).
106. Pope Pius Xl, Encyclical on Restoring the Christian Social Order (Quadragesimo Anno,
May 15, 1931), reprinted in 2 SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS: EIGHTEEN ENCYCLICALS OF SOCIAL RECON-
STRUCTION BY POPE PIUS XI 174 (Joseph Husslein ed., 1942).
107. For an account of this "localist politics," see ROBERT COLES, DOROTHY DAY: A RADICAL
DEVOTION 89-109 (1987).
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few of which I list here in order to give more flesh and blood and
social and historical location to what I am describing: the
Bruderhoff; the Koinonia Community in Americus, Georgia; the
Worker Priest movement; some ecclesial base communities of Latin
America; most Trappist monasteries; the Little Sisters and the Lit-
tle Brothers of Jesus; the L'Arche Community; and any other body
of believers whose lives are similarly grounded in the life of the one,
holy, catholic, and apostolic church.
The prophetic black churches belong on this list, for they have
certainly exemplified a Christian faith that is, in and of itself, politi-
cal. This is why their fruition in the Civil Rights movement is better
described not as a victory for the First Amendment, but as a victory
for the black churches themselves. Through patient and faithful en-
durance they were able to educate people like Martin Luther King,
Jr., and many others in a politics that resisted both racism and the
resentment it engenders. The prophetic black churches thereby ena-
bled African-Americans to acquire a sense of peoplehood that was
denied them in American democracy. On this score, if it can be said
in response to the 1956 Supreme Court ruling that outlawed segre-
gated transportation 10 8 that "God Almighty has spoken from Wash-
ington, D.C.,"10 9 then it can also be said that this was only because
God Almighty had already spoken from Montgomery, Alabama.
God had spoken in the late night meetings of organizers, in the
songs and chants of the boycotters, in the preaching of Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. - and most importantly in the witness of their many
predecessors who, in the midst of slavery and segregation, spent
their lives faithfully handing on the gospel to the next generation.
V. OVERALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT HAS Co-OPTED
CHRISTIANITY
And yet, it may be better to avoid the notion of God speaking
from Washington, D.C. altogether, since the vocabulary coming out
of Washington is chronically ambivalent. As we have learned in re-
cent years, words like "freedom," "justice," and "equality" can be
put to use not only by the Southern Christian Leadership Council
but also by the Ku Klux Klan; not only for good ends, such as inte-
108. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), affd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (strik-
ing down Alabama statutes that required segregated bussing in Montgomery on due process and
equal protection grounds).
109. Dyson, supra note 2, at 129.
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grating bus lines and lunch counters, but also for pernicious ends,
such as rolling back civil rights and protecting racially hateful
speech. Twenty years ago, the relationship between the United
States and the well-being of African-Americans seemed positive and
progressive; today, it is not clear whether that relationship will re-
main stable over the next twenty years. Perhaps the differences sep-
arating Dyson and myself stem from the fact that he writes as one
whose church has shown how the political machinery of the state
can be used as a vehicle for justice; whereas I write as one whose
church has shown how the political machinery of the state can be
used as a vehicle for injustice. This is what makes me wary of en-
thusiastic appraisals of any nation-state, including the United States
of America, whose First Amendment, overall, has co-opted
Christianity.
It is always dangerous to draw parallels too closely between Euro-
pean fascism and American democracy. Nonetheless, certain paral-
lels exist. As World War II was coming to a close, Luigi Sturzo
warned that Fascism would not die with Mussolini. He wrote that
"the Fascism that ante-dates Mussolini - the Fascism of all times
and all countries - that brand of Fascism never dies. It adapts it-
self, instead, to all climates and all temperatures; it dresses accord-
ing to the fashion, disguises itself and hides."11 Moreover, Sturzo
detected "Fascist residues in the Western countries which are pre-
sumed to be, now or in the future, democracies." '' Among these he
included America because of its propensity to demonize its wartime
enemies and breed nationalist resentment - a propensity that was
recently exhibited again in America's crusade for the "democracy"
of Kuwait. Given the fact that yellow ribbons were readily seen on
church doors during the Gulf War, it seems that the church's pri-
mary task in fostering religious freedom is one of formation: form-
ing Christians so that they have the skills and practices needed to
identify the Fascism that dresses according to American fashion,
that hides itself under American disguise.
In this regard, the First Amendment has not been very good to
Christianity. Indeed, as the Supreme Court in recent decades has
curbed the freedom of the churches by what Justice Arthur
Goldberg once called "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the sec-
110. Luigi Sturzo, Has Fascism Ended With Mussolini?, 7 REv. POL. 306, 306 (1945).
111. Id. at 311.
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ular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious."11 This
is but a symptom of what Sturzo called the "confessionalism" of the
secular state.113 It is a confessionalism which has gained hegemony
in many sectors of American society, as was made painfully evident
in August 1992 when the American Bar Association formally en-
dorsed the right to privacy as expressed in Roe v. Wade.1" On this
score, there is another "real wall of separation most grievous to
American Christianity and the Church of Christ."" 5 It is the wall
of separation between the born and the unborn.
112. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1962) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring); see Glendon & Yanes, supra note 15, at 496 (discussing Justice Goldberg's concurrence
which "agreed that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of neutrality, but he
saw that there were several ways in which that elusive concept could produce outcomes that were
far from neutral").
113. STURZO, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 84, at 526.
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the American Bar Association's endorsement of
this opinion, see Tamar Lewin, 3,000 Quit Bar Group Over Abortion Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1992, at A30.
115. Dyson, supra note 2, at 159.
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